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Key Judgments 
The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) utilization of harsh ethnic control policies 
coupled with extreme and violent enforcement by the People’s Armed Police (PAP) will 
likely drive the Uighurs to become a security threat to the PRC and disrupt international 
relationships. The Uighurs do not currently constitute a security threat to the PRC based on their 
limited connection to terrorist organizations and attacks. Due to several underlying factors, the 
Uighurs represent a political concern to the PRC and the conflict between the PRC and the 
Uighurs is fueled by ethnic tensions. Ongoing security operations in the Uighurs’ home province 
of Xinjiang exacerbate tensions as the PAP enforce harsh ethnic control policies. As the 
international community is becoming increasingly aware of the situation in Xinjiang, the PRC 
has come under pressure to explain its actions. These underlying forces could plausibly drive the 
Uighurs to become a security threat to the PRC in the future.  
 
Background 
 The Uighurs are a Chinese Ethnic-Muslim minority residing in Xinjiang, an autonomous 
region that takes up one-sixth of China’s western border.2 The Uighurs have had the goal of 
independence from the PRC since the PRC was formed in 1949 and this goal was significantly 
hindered by the emergence of the PRC as a powerful nation-state in the early 1990s.3 The PRC 
became increasingly concerned with Uighur separatist movements following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent independence of Central Asian States.4 This time 
period was also marked by PRC fears of the viability of the communist system.  
  
To maintain a strong, unified communist nation, the PRC has deeply embedded the 
concept of “One China”.5 Any strong minority identity threatens the PRC’s views of “One 
China”. In order to foster a strong and unified China, the PRC has a multi-level system in which 
individual citizens are always expected to play a role in promoting the PRC and controlling 
dissent by remaining loyal to the PRC and the government’s decisions.6 In all regions, the PRC 
tends to respond to domestic hostilities that threaten this loyalty system with oppressive policies 
that force assimilation as well as the direct force of the PAP.7  
  
In Xinjiang, the PRC has been utilizing counterterrorism operations in order to control 
the Uighur population. The PRC asserted a link on 29 November 2001 between Uighur members 
of the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in an 
officially released party document.8 In 2002, the ETIM was officially declared a terrorist group 
through United States (US) Executive Order 13224 and United Nations (UN) Security Council 
Resolutions 1267 and 1390 which justified the PRC’s assertion.9 This official recognition later 
caused confusion as to the true threat posed by the Uighurs to the PRC.  
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Analysis 
 The Uighurs do not currently constitute a serious threat to the PRC’s stability. In order to 
be considered a serious threat, a party must have high levels of both intent and capabilities.10 The 
Uighurs have high levels of intention as a separatist threat, but relatively low levels of intention 
of causing physical harm to the PRC. Regardless, the PRC has currently diminished the Uighur’s 
capabilities to pose a threat to the PRC’s homeland security. PRC intelligence and security forces 
have successfully kept Uighur separatist forces from effectively organizing any sort of resistance 
inside or outside of China through collaboration efforts with other nations in Central Asia as well 
as domestic counterterrorism operations.11 The few existing dangerous Uighur groups lack the 
coordination and sophistication needed to make significant progress towards their goals of 
causing harm to the PRC, due to the extreme policing and political oversight of the Xinjiang 
region. 
 
 The conflict in Xinjiang between the Uighurs and the PRC is one fueled primarily by 
ethnic tensions. The Uighurs have not positively benefited the same way as the Han Chinese 
majority has from the PRC’s efforts to modernize and improve life in Xinjiang. Economic 
disparity is driving ethnic unrest, as the Uighurs are unwelcome, underpaid, and underemployed 
in their own region.12 The PRC’s “Great Leap West” in 1999 prompted tens of thousands of Han 
citizens to emigrate to Xinjiang in order to take advantage of government-funded economic 
expansion; taking jobs and positions away from the Uighurs.13 Many Uighurs reside in poorer 
rural areas, relying on low paying jobs in dangerous or unsubsidized fields.14 Such 
modernization efforts in Xinjiang has prompted the idea amongst Uighurs that their culture is 
being targeted by the central government and the Xinjiang region is no longer their own. 
Divisions along ethnic lines in multiple areas of life have continued to drive a wedge between the 
PRC and the Uighurs in Xinjiang (See Outside-In Chart in Appendix B).  
 
The PRC’s political actions in 
Xinjiang began by focusing primarily on 
homogenizing the Chinese culture within the 
region, but the underlying ethnic unrest 
labeled the Uighurs as a security threat to the 
PRC. The Uighurs became increasingly 
discontented by PRC policies that oppressed 
Uighur culture and the PRC continued to 
create such policies with the intention of 
homogenizing the culture and mitigating the 
external separatist threat. As tensions within 
the region grew, the PRC began to become 
concerned with the possible relationship 
between the Uighurs and Islamic Terrorist 
Groups (ITGs). This concern was fueled by 
the geographic position of Xinjiang in 
relation to Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries that tend to have cells of Al-Qaeda and 
the Islamic State (IS); potentially allowing for the easy exit and return of radicalized Uighur 
foreign fighters (Figure 2: Nations Neighboring Xinjiang.15).16 
 
Figure 2: Nations Neighboring Xinjiang. 
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The PRC viewing the Uighurs as a threat to their national security has exacerbated 
Uighur tensions. The core conflict between the PRC and the Uighurs is due to a self-perpetuating 
conflict over harsh control policies and the PRC’s treatment of Uighurs in the Xinjiang region 
(See R2: Central Conflict Loop in Appendix A). Examples of such policies include laws against 
speaking Turkish and dressing in traditional Uighur garments; aimed at forcing the assimilation 
of Uighurs into Chinese culture.17 The more control policies and actions taken by the PRC in the 
region, the greater the level of discontent amongst Uighurs and the greater the chances of dissent 
within the region. This dynamic between the PRC and the Uighurs creates a vicious cycle as the 
actions of dissent are met with harsher control policies and other actions by the PRC that create 
an even more hostile environment. 
  
 The PRC does not differentiate between non-violent and violent political actions against 
the central government’s policies and responds to all acts of discontent amongst citizens with 
counterterrorism forces.18 The PRC links “terrorist activities” to any actions, attempted actions, 
or goals that “undermine public security”; which is a considerably broad definition and a large 
departure from the type of actions that would be considered terrorist actions in the US and other 
Western nations.19 The discontent in Xinjiang over the previously mentioned ethnic control 
policies introduces a third actor in the region, the People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a 
paramilitary PRC force responsible for security within the borders of China as well as law 
enforcement and preventative actions within the troubled regions they are deployed to.20  
  
 The self-perpetuating conflict in Xinjiang between the Uighurs and the PRC causes the 
Uighurs to be ethnically targeted in two ways via the acting force of the PAP. The first method 
of ethnic targeting occurs via direct conflict with the PAP. PRC law gives the PAP the right to 
act as a police force when deployed into a certain region and to “control” certain people or 
groups when acting officers of the PAP deem it to be necessary.21 In Xinjiang, the PAP has 
consistently utilized military level force to control the populations of Uighurs without making a 
discrimination between Uighur activists peacefully protesting and Uighur activists involved in 
riots within capital cities.22 In December 2017, over 10,000 PAP officers were deployed to a 
rally in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s capitol, which was intended to be peaceful and led to the arrest of 
many protestors.23 
 
 The second method of ethnic targeting occurs via the PAP’s digital Integrated Joint 
Operations Platform (IJOP) and impacts all Uighurs in Xinjiang regardless of their participation 
in any acts of dissension. IJOP is a growing PAP database that aggregates extreme amounts of 
data collected on Uighurs such as family history, biological data, online messaging interactions, 
and recorded daily behaviors.24 The PAP has multiple sources for the collection of this data from 
CCTV cameras with facial recognition, existing Uighur legal records, and Wi-Fi scanning 
systems.25 There are 31,000 convenience police stations in urban areas of Xinjiang since 2016 
that enable the collection of this data and serve as security checkpoints which require Uighurs to 
place smartphones on a sensor in order to collect all the data from the phone.26 The aggregated 
data is utilized for predictive policing in order to flag individual Uighurs as potential threats to 
PRC and PAP control.27 
 
 Both direct PAP force and PAP predictive policing in Xinjiang even further exacerbate 
Uighur tensions in the region. Actions done by the PAP in Xinjiang represent the direct 
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enforcement of the ethnic control policies that drove the conflict between the PRC and the 
Uighurs in the first place. The large-scale surveillance of Xinjiang further intensifies Uighur 
sentiments of ethnic oppression as the PAP utilizes IJOP flagged individuals to target these 
individuals before they have even violated an ethnic policy or displayed any signs of disloyalty 
to the PRC.28 
 
 An unexpected consequence of the PRC’s broad definition of terrorism and strict 
dissension policies is that the Uighurs ironically became more vulnerable to sympathizing with 
and joining ITGs than they were before (See Background Shift Analysis in Honors Appendix 
1).29 The PRC first made the connection between the Uighurs and terrorism in 2001, years prior 
to the first Uighur linked terrorist attack on the PRC’s homeland.30 ITGs are also inclined to 
support Uighurs in Xinjiang due to the PRC’s attacks against the Muslim faith in 
counterterrorism laws as profession of the Muslim faith outside of very few government 
sanctioned religious outlets is considered “illegal religious activity”.31  
 
 The stringent counterterrorism policies that ethnically target Uighurs were eventually 
followed by terrorist attacks on the PRC’s homeland that were connected to ITGs. Before the 
2008 Beijing Olympics, the Minister of Public Security for the PRC expelled 4,000 to 5,000 
Uighurs from Beijing over fear that there would be a terrorist attack on the games.32 This 
prompted the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an Al-Qaeda splinter group, to release a video 
claiming that Uighur fighters would attack the PRC and the Olympics due to harsh treatment.33 
Following these events, the PRC began to experience larger and more frequent terrorist attacks 
on their mainland that were accredited to Uighurs as parts of universally known ITGs. Uighur 
foreign fighters were linked to several ITG claimed attack on China in the 2013-2015 time 
period. The most extreme being September 2014’s bomb attacks and clashes that killed 50 
people and injured 50 people.34 
 
 The Uighurs still do not currently pose a major terrorist threat to the PRC, though this 
connection between ITGs and Uighurs has grown as a result of the self-perpetuating ethnic 
conflict between the PRC and the Uighurs. Uighurs tend to participate in “disparate 
organizations” of ITGs with “differing goals” which makes it less probable that one larger, 
global ITG would maintain a continued interest in the region.35 Uighur utilization of terrorism 
against the PRC is currently hamstrung and aimed more at the goal of political autonomy in 
response to ethnic oppression.36 This goal does not align with the main goal of the ITGs; 
establishing a global caliphate of Islamic rule.37  
 
 Without a major terrorist threat stemming from Uighurs in Xinjiang, the PRC’s claims 
that harsh control measures within the region are necessary to maintain order and protect their 
homeland security are not justifiable.38 Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch, and the World Uighur Congress, have continuously been filing protests 
with Western governments and international organizations over the PRC’s treatment of Uighurs 
for years. The PRC has thwarted this attention in the past by justifying their actions based on 
necessary counterterrorism operations but is no longer able to do so (See B8: PRC CT 
Operations Justifications in Appendix A). 
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 Pressure has recently been put on the PRC to give a better explanation for their actions 
which has invited more international attention to the situation in Xinjiang (See B6: UN Responds 
to Human Rights Violations and B7: PRC Unwanted International Attention in Appendix A). In 
2018, the UN and other international organizations began to call attention to apparent human 
right violations in Xinjiang based on PAP actions and ethnic control policies.39 Threats of 
sanctions and diplomatic warnings have been utilized as tools to apply more pressure on the 
PRC. International pressure is currently mounting against the PRC as little action has been taken 
by the PRC to prove that they are not violating human rights. The PRC attempted to alleviate 
suspicions by welcoming delegations from multiple countries into the region in December 2018 
and January 2019, however this increased suspicions.40 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Re-education camps in Xinjiang has emerged at the current forefront of international 
attention to the PRC’s alleged human rights violations. The Uighurs who have been detained by 
the PAP are being sent indefinitely to camps which were revealed via satellite imagery (Figure 
3: Satellite Imagery Showing the Appearance of Re-Education Camps41).42 The PRC claims are 
centers to reduce Islamic extremism by vocational training and teaching detainees traditional 
PRC concepts, dress, language, and law for better assimilation.43 Many US and European 
newspapers have referred to re-education camps in Xinjiang as “concentration camps”.44 Many 
nations and international human rights groups have called for a formal US investigation into the 
region, but the investigation has either not been completed or has not yet been publicized.  
 
The current status-quo of the Uighur situation in Xinjiang is unsustainable. The future of 
the situation in Xinjiang will likely be driven by the extent to which ITGs and terrorism are 
involved in the conflict, the PRC’s perception of control over the region, and the extent to which 
the Uighur situation is visible to the international community (See Divergent Scenario 
Development in Appendix D). Currently, the conflict in Xinjiang is in a transitional period and 
there are a few possibilities for how the situation will evolve out to about 2023. 
 
The most plausible future for the Uighur – PRC conflict is the Uighurs becoming a 
security threat to the PRC by freedom fighter movements. The lack of direct involvement by 
Figure 3: Satellite Imagery Showing the Appearance of Re-Education Camps. 
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ITGs in Xinjiang coupled with international awareness of PRC human rights violations create an 
environment in which the PRC faces damaged international relationships and sanctions against 
it. The PRC faces international sanctions based on many issues and could potentially utilize the 
alleviation of forces and release of prisoners in Xinjiang to divert attention from other sanctions 
aimed at controlling the PRC’s economic and cyber actions.45 The continued lack of proof that 
ITGs are directly involved within the Uighur population makes it difficult for the PRC to explain 
their actions in Xinjiang. The Uighur population, however, has grown to be more vulnerable to 
large scale resistance movements and ITG tactics based upon the past twenty years of massive 
oppression operations by the PRC. The freedom fighter movement could also gain traction by the 
release of the around one million prisoners who have likely faced the worst human rights 
violations inside the re-education camps.46  
 
An alternative future for the Uighur – PRC that has a lower probability, but a higher 
impact is a radicalized Xinjiang as Uighurs could turn to ITGs for support. The environment 
would be similar to the one in the previous future with one major difference, ITGs are now 
directly involved in the conflict. The underlying ethno-religious tension in Xinjiang combined 
with the highly oppressive actions taken by the PRC in Xinjiang create a vulnerability in Uighurs 
to look to ITGs for support in the conflict which could be multiplied if the PRC pulls back 
security in the region. Xinjiang is geographically situated in a way that could create the 
conditions necessary for ITG cells to form within the region.47 ITGs could take advantage of this 
opportunity because it would give them greater access to destabilize a non-Islamic government 
that is a strong nation state unlike the ones terrorist cells typically exist within.48 This future 
scenario would plausibly be highly chaotic due to past underlying confusion as to the true nature 
of ITG involvement within Xinjiang and current focus on the PRC’s actions. Though highly 
impactful, this scenario is not very plausible given the lack of connection between ITGs and the 
Uighurs especially in the group’s differing motives.  
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Conclusion 
A common theme emerging from the analysis is that the PRC is driving the Uighur issue 
forward. The PRC in recent years has been justifying the utilization of extreme counterterrorism 
in Xinjiang as a necessary step in reducing terrorist attacks aimed at their homeland as well as 
reducing the number and reach of global terrorist networks. The backlash against these policies 
are taken by the PRC as Western propaganda that is designed to damage US-China relations and 
the true extent to which Uighurs are unfairly prosecuted has somewhat been concealed until 
recently.49 
 
• There is a moderate level of confidence in the analytical conclusions generated in this 
capstone project as they were well supported by multiple analytic methodologies as well 
as background research.  
 
• There is a moderate level of confidence in the sources utilized in this analysis due to 
the nature of China as a research target. The PRC has a high level of control over 
journalists, political researchers, and reports coming from the region which can impact 
the information reported to the public. We were also limited in the sources that could be 
read as neither of us can read Chinese.  
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Appendix A: Causal Analysis 
Causal analysis is used to illustrate connections between actors with differing strategies 
which can highlight relationships between them and unexpected consequences of these 
interactions. Casual loop diagraming is a causal analysis methodology that focuses on creating a 
Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) to illustrate the mental models of the main actors in a system as 
well as the ways in which these mental models connect with one another.   
 
Causal Loop Diagram 
Figure 4: Causal Forces Influencing the Situation in Xinjiang. 
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Causal Loops Mentioned in the Paper 
 
Figure 5: The Central Conflict (R2). 
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Figure 6: UN Responds to Human Rights Violations (B6). 
 
 
Figure 7: PRC Justification of CT Operations (B8). 
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Figure 8: PRC Unwanted International Attention (B7). 
Causal Loop Stories 
Actor Mental Models 
(B1) PRC: Han Superiority  
For decades, the Han ethnic majority has dominated many aspects of Chinese life. The 
Chinese Communist Party utilizes and solidifies this through use of the “Zhonghua Minzu” 
(Chinese Nation) system, which encourages the idea of a single Chinese unity. Minzu 
encourages the idea that minorities are backward people who need Han assistance in order to 
move forward. To the Han central government, control over territories like Xinjiang will slip 
once the Han start losing their cultural supremacy. To counter this, the government imposes 
ethnic control policies that restrict the cultural freedom of the minority groups in China. Once 
the control policies take effect, Han superiority goes back up. 
(B2) PRC: Regional Stability  
The PRC also has a political goal for controlling their minority populations. For example, a 
prevented uprising in Xinjiang dissuades political dissidents in Tibet from trying something 
similar. A loss of regional stability decreases the PRC’s control over their territory. The PRC 
then implements its ethnic control policies in order to drive down ethnic feelings that don’t 
line up with the Minzu beliefs. Regional stability goes back up once the ethnic feelings are 
suppressed.  
(B3) PRC: People’s Armed Police 
The PRC has more tools available besides “soft” policy changes. The People’s Armed Police 
(PAP) stand ready to deploy and assist local police in suppressing dissent. As stability drops, 
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the PAP begins to carry out more missions to decrease the frequency of dissenting actions. As 
the acts of dissent occur less frequently, the stability of the region increases. 
(B4) Violent Uighur Separatist Movements 
Some Uighurs feel that more extreme action is needed to get what they want. Uighur separatist 
groups have similar aims to their “non-violent” countrymen, but attempt to achieve them in 
extremely different ways. To them, more dissenters come about as the discontent rises. This 
leads to an increase in the frequency of violent political actions (riots, bombings, etc.). 
Eventually, the Uighurs will gain more political autonomy, which decreases the discontent. 
(B5) Non-Violent Uighur Independence Groups 
The Uighurs don’t agree with the ethnic control policies and police actions being pressed upon 
them and look for ways to gain cultural autonomy. As the degree of discontent among the 
Uighurs increases, there are more people who feel like something needs to change. The more 
people that are involved in non-violent political movements, the more likely it is that political 
action (protests, working within the system, etc.) will take place. Ideally, the Uighurs’ use of 
non-violent political action will cause an increase in their cultural autonomy. This increase in 
cultural autonomy lowers the discontent that the Uighurs feel. 
B6: UN: Respond to Human Rights Violations 
The United Nations (UN) has a rigid stance on human rights. If a member nation breaks these 
rules, there are serious repercussions on the international stage. As there are more instances of 
human rights violations in the country, more people flee the country as political refugees. The 
more political refugees there are, the more likely it is that the international community 
becomes aware that violations are taking place. This increased awareness prompts the 
international community to start applying pressure on the violating country, through economic 
sanctions or other political tools. Ideally, this would lower the number of instances of human 
rights violations in the country. 
(R1) ITG: Recruitment  
Islamic Terrorist Groups (ITG) broadly include groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS), Al 
Qaeda, and the Taliban. The common motivation for the actors studied in this loop would be to 
establish a global caliphate through violent means. ITGs fit into the broader picture of the 
Uighur - PRC conflict because they utilize the tension felt by the Uighur Islamic minority as a 
recruitment tactic to increase their number of sympathizers and attacks that can be claimed as 
part of their missions. ITGs are focused on their degree of influence on a global scale. 
Influence campaigns, such as on social media, increase the popularity of the ITG and gives 
them access to more fighters. The more fighters the ITG has; the more terrorist attacks they 
can perpetuate and claim. This ultimately creates a reinforcing diagram as the degree of 
influence as increases which further perpetuates their recruitment model. The reinforcing 
dynamic goes back to the initial motivation of the group in that they will not stop until they 
have achieved a global caliphate.  
 
Interactions  
(B7) PRC: Unwanted International Pressure  
Islamic Terrorist Groups (ITG) broadly include groups such as the Islamic State (or ISIS), Al 
Qaeda, and the Taliban. The common motivation for the actors studied in this loop would be to 
establish a global caliphate through violent means. ITGs fit into the broader picture of the 
Uighur - PRC conflict because they utilize the tension felt by the Uighur Islamic minority as a 
recruitment tactic to increase their number of sympathizers and attacks that can be claimed as 
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part of their missions. ITGs are focused on their degree of influence on a global scale. 
Influence campaigns, such as on social media, increase the popularity of the ITG and gives 
them access to more fighters. The more fighters the ITG has; the more terrorist attacks they 
can perpetuate and claim. This ultimately creates a reinforcing diagram as the degree of 
influence as increases which further perpetuates their recruitment model. The reinforcing 
dynamic goes back to the initial motivation of the group in that they will not stop until they 
have achieved a global caliphate.  
(B8) PRC: CT Operation Justification 
This loop is the interaction between the PRC, the Islamic Terrorists Groups (ITGs), and the 
UN which creates a dynamic in which the PRC can leverage the involvement of ITGs in order 
to justify counterterrorism operations. The main interaction occurs when the frequency of 
terrorist attacks (or terrorist threats) on China’s homeland increases the frequency of acts of 
dissension on China’s homeland which decreases China’s regional stability. This creates a 
visible terrorist threat allowing China to justify harsher counterterrorism measures and lessen 
the degree of international pressure created in the B7: PRC: Unwanted International Pressure 
loop in order to act against ITGs. The PRC then utilizes the ethnic control policies as 
counterterrorism policies in order to act against the frequency of terrorist attacks claimed by 
ITGs. When labeled as counterterrorism policies targeted against a globally perceived threat, 
the PRC is able to justify their harsher control policies.  
(R2) Central Conflict  
The central conflict regarding the Uighur situation occurs between the PRC, the PAP, and both 
the violent Uighur separatist movements and nonviolent Uighur independence groups. 
Generally, the Uighur population perceives the PRC’s ethnic control policies and the PAP’s 
actions as instances of human rights violations targeted at them; increasing the degree of 
discontent amongst them. Uighurs who make the decision to act on these typically join either 
violent or nonviolent groups as seen in the B4 and B4 loops which end in political actions that 
are either violent or nonviolent. Both types of actions by Uighur groups are viewed as 
dissension by the PRC and often the PRC has trouble discerning when the political action is a 
violent threat which explains why the two different types of movements end up fueling the 
same conflict. As the acts of dissension increase, the overall regional stability decreases which 
directly activates PAP actions and simultaneously decreased the PRC’s control over the 
Xinjiang territory which creates the need for more ethnic control policies. These actions by the 
PRC and the PAP then feed back into the instances of human rights violations; continuously 
agitating the conflict. As the cycle continues and the degree of discontent continually raises 
amongst the Uighurs, more Uighurs will join either type of group.  
(R3) ITG: Leveraging PRC-Uighur Conflict 
This loop regards the interest that ITGs would have in the PRC-Uighur conflict. Since Uighurs 
who subscribe to the violent separatist movements are a Muslim population acting out against 
a non-Muslim ruling government through a violent manner, the number of dissenters are 
increasing the popularity of ITGs which in turn feeds into the ITG recruitment cycle. The 
struggle Uighurs face against the PRC can be leveraged by ITGs as propaganda through 
influence operations which can inspire more dissenters within the Uighur population.  
(R4) ITG: Uighur Foreign Fighters 
This loop regards the external support the violent Uighur separatist movements receive from 
ITGs. When Uighur dissenters look outwards towards ITGs, the popularity of the ITG rises 
within the violent Uighur population. At this point, dissenters can leave Xinjiang and become 
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fighters for various ITGs in various Middle Eastern nations. After a time delay, usually one or 
two years, the Uighurs whom became ITG fighters can return to Xinjiang and contribute the 
violent political actions. In turn, the radicalized foreign fighters who return to Xinjiang further 
agitate the population of violent Uighurs. This generates more discontent and more popularity 
of the ITGs; inspiring more Uighurs to leave to gain training at ITG camps. The ITG Uighur 
Foreign Fighters model is a reinforcing causal system because it works to continually raise the 
amount of fighters and dissenters and contains no balancing mechanism.   
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Appendix B: Outside-In Analysis 
Outside-In thinking is used to frame subjects within a broader context.  Looking into 
other areas besides the main “theme” adds to the background information surrounding the issue.  
In this project, the Uighur issue might be classified as a security problem, but the deep cultural 
aspect of the issue hits upon many different domains. Researching and analyzing the issue from 
the point of view of religion, economics, sociology, and demographics could help provide a 
better picture of the issue.  Completing an Outside-In analysis added to the understanding of the 
main issue. Examining potential reasons for the Uighur problem through other subjects, such as 
economics and environmental, aided in viewing the main problem through a new light. 
 
Most Prominent Factor: The Political Sphere  
➢ The Uighurs impact the PRC’s politics on both an international and domestic level. On 
the domestic level, the PRC relies heavily on national unity according to a “Minzu 
System”; a system in which all ethnic minorities coexist peacefully with the majority to 
make up one strong unified China. The PRC diverts contentious issues towards local 
administrations in order to increase a sense of individual responsibility. This creates a 
multilevel system in which citizens who are loyal to the PRC are expected to play a 
role in promoting the government and controlling dissent.  
➢ On the international level, the PRC mainly relies on the idea of “realpolitik” in order to 
serve the nation’s interests. As a Confucian society, the PRC will often overlook 
religious differences in order to forge a connection with Islamic countries in the East 
based off the PRC’s goal to keep Western Christian influence out of the Eastern 
sphere. The PRC also has the goal of maintaining non-confrontational relationships 
with bordering countries and five out of the fourteen of these countries are Muslim-
majority. 
➢ The Uighurs impact the domestic political system because they typically do not 
identify as a loyal minority to China and they demand separation. This diminishes the 
internal cohesion that the PRC seeks in domestic politics. PRC suppression of the 
Uighurs, as a Muslim minority, impact the international system by contradicting the 
cooperative relationship the PRC attempts to build with Muslim nations.   
 
2nd Most Prominent Factor: The Economical Sphere 
➢ Xinjiang is an economic powerhouse for China.  Xinjiang is the country’s biggest 
producer of oil, natural gas, and cotton, among other products, which make the central 
government extremely interested in maintaining control over the region.  However, the 
economic success of the region is not shared evenly between the Han majority and 
other ethnic groups and leads to more ethnic tensions.  
➢ Xinjiang has large natural stores of natural gas, coal, and other minerals, which is 
greatly desired by the developed eastern part of the country.  Much of the province also 
relies on an agriculturally-based economy, predominantly cotton.  In turn, the Uighurs 
mainly work in these industries.  Economic problems arise for the Uighurs in these 
fields, as the government is attempting to limit coal production to decrease pollution 
and water scarcity causes huge issues for the cotton industry.  The government 
attempts to provide subsidies for these industries, but many farmers and miners feel 
that the given funds are not enough. 
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➢ Due to the issues in Xinjiang’s main industries and the general under-development of 
the region, the Chinese government attempted a massive investment campaign to 
modernize the region’s industry and living conditions in 1999.  Overall, many residents 
of Xinjiang feel the benefits of this initiative, as living conditions have greatly 
improved across the board in the cities.  The problem is, many Han Chinese have 
immigrated to Xinjiang to participate in the economic growth.  In turn, they are the 
ones who have felt most of the benefits.  Many Uighurs struggle to compete for jobs 
and still rely on less prosperous jobs in the countryside.  This further proves to the 
Uighurs that the Han majority are favored in China and further exacerbates the ethnic 
tensions. 
➢ The environment has suffered in Xinjiang due to decades of resource exploitation and 
poor management.  Poorer Uighurs in particular suffer from smog, poor water quality 
and supply, and radiation exposure, among other problems.  This environmental 
degradation, when combined with the poverty many Uighurs live in, greatly increases 
the ethnic tensions in the region, as the Han have better employment and do not feel 
the negative environmental effects as strongly. 
 
3rd Most Prominent Sphere: The Military Sphere  
➢ Xinjiang is militarily important to China due to border control, maintaining the status 
quo, and regional dominance. Xinjiang contains a very large portion of China’s 
Western border and acts as a buffer region to Central Asia. Exerting control over the 
region serves the double purpose of maintaining the “ethnic unity” of China and 
keeping China’s strategic options open in Eurasia. 
➢ The border of Xinjiang spans across a wide area, touching Mongolia, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and several other countries. If Xinjiang attempts to gain more autonomy or 
independence, Beijing could lose access to all those borders, as well as the buffer zone 
that Xinjiang provides. If a crisis were to emerge at one of the borders, the Chinese 
army would have problems accessing troubled areas. 
➢ The central government also has concerns with ethnic unity that center around 
Xinjiang.  The Uighurs represent one of the more vocal ethnic minorities in China, 
which concerns Beijing. If such feelings of “nationalism” or ethnic tensions spread to 
other areas, like Tibet, the government would have a large amount of issues to handle 
across the country. The government has handled ethnic or separatist issues with 
military force in the past. A countrywide military crackdown would have devastating 
repercussions for China on the international stage. 
 
4th Most Prominent Sphere: Religion  
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➢ The PRC is ideologically linked to Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist religions. China is 
an atheistic state with worshipping communities mostly being linked to different local 
saints with no unified. This type of community worship differs greatly from that of 
other religions in which the focus is on a higher power(s). The PRC values science and 
communism as truths over religion; it has long held the belief that religion breads 
gullibility and superstition. Those who associate with the traditional practices of China 
believe religion is more so a way of living life, rather than being a theological 
construct.  
➢ The Uighurs are of predominantly Islamic faith and hold to traditional Islamic views. 
This creates a religious clash with the PRC and breeds tension. Though the PRC has 
attempted to show that they align with Islamic religions, Uighurs believe that they are 
religiously oppressed by Chinese rule. 
➢ The factor of religion, however, does not really dominate the discontent the Uighurs 
have with the PRC. Though religion fuels the tension, the conflict does not revolve 
around it. Instead, religion can is mostly construed as an ideological weapon to achieve 
foundationally nationalistic goals. 
 
 
 
5th Most Prominent Sphere: The Geographical Sphere  
➢ Xinjiang covers one-sixth of China’s territory and a large portion of the Western 
border. The autonomous region borders eight different countries and is integral in 
cultural and economic exchanges occurring across the border between the East and the 
West. Through Pakistan, Xinjiang has access to the Arabian Sea which is key in 
transporting goods and oil. Xinjiang also has access to railways, pipelines, and roads 
that are crucial to China’s New Silk and Road Initiative. 
➢ Xinjiang is important in 3 main goals of the PRC: border stability, stopping separatism, 
and access to key energy resources. China historically places a lot of value on 
“territorial unity” and believes that strong control over all of their territory will keep 
the nation strong. Xinjiang is also an important aspect of the PRC’s “geographic 
contiguity”: a concept that allows China to expand political and economic ties with 
Central Asian nations. This plan is highly contingent on Xinjiang bordering three 
Central Asian republics and historically remaining in good relations with these 
republics. 
➢ Uighur militancy or separatist actions in Xinjiang is of concern to the PRC due to the 
importance of Xinjiang in the PRC’s strategic plans. 
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Appendix C: Red Team Analysis 
Red team analysis is a method utilized when an issue needs to be understood from the 
perspective of an adversary. The method requires that the analyst view the issues as though they 
were analyzing it for the adversary’s leader or decision maker.50 This method can be utilized to 
give multiple interpretations of an issue and understand other forces or dynamics driving the 
issue forward. Official red team analysis is typically conducted by a cell of analysts within an 
agency that solely view issues from the perspective of the adversary.51Red team analysis was 
adapted to this project by flipping the first two methodologies to be from the perspective of PRC 
as well as researching and identifying how the PRC tends to make political decisions. This 
methodology was utilized to challenge assumptions and conclusions made in other 
methodologies and provide a more complete picture of the many different sides of the issue. 
 
Causal Analysis from PRC’s Perspective 
 Chinese political decision-making revolves around their belief of cultural superiority. 
International law and minority rights are secondary to the security and stability of the 
state. Chinese officials likely view this system with a focus on loops B8 and B7.   
 The PRC’s goal is to legitimize their domestic counterterrorism operations and 
subsequently their ethnic policies. In recent years, China’s CT operations have come 
under international scrutiny as more Uighurs flee China with reports of human rights 
violations (Loop B7). Beijing has been forced into a balancing act, where they strive to 
maintain their domestic security while limiting diplomatic pressure from Western 
countries. As more terrorist attacks occur on Chinese soil, the more ammunition 
Beijing has to justify their counterterrorism methodologies to the rest of the world 
(Loop B8). 
Outside In Analysis from PRC’s Perspective  
 The PRC tends to be focused primarily on the political dominance of the Han Chinese 
ethnic majority. Within the outside-in domains for looking at the Uighur problem, it is 
likely that the PRC would focus heavily on the political domain considering the 
perceived threat a culturally immersed minority would pose towards the Han majority. 
As a sub-category to the political sphere, the PRC as an atheist state likely views the 
religious domain as a factor that divides the Uighur minority from the Han majority. 
The PRC also has the political goal of maintaining non-confrontational relationships 
with Islamic minorities in order to maintain non-confrontational relationships with 
bordering Islamic nations. In order to overcome this discrepancy, the PRC can either 
focus heavily on ethnic control policies unrelated to religion or on broader security 
concerns.   
 When national unity cannot be achieved through political means, the conflict with the 
Uighurs becomes a greater threat that the PRC. The Xinjiang region is significant in 
connecting the PRC to bordering nations; giving it both military and economic 
significance. Unrest or uprisings within the Xinjiang region constitute the involvement 
of the People’s Armed Police to maintain territorial control. At the point that the 
People’s Armed Police gets involved, the conflict between the Uighurs and the PRC 
then gets classified within the central government as a terrorist conflict and suppression 
tactics follow from here.  
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The Uighurs from the Perspective of the PRC 
The Uighurs represent a serious security threat to the PRC due to their connection with Islamic 
extremist groups, non-Han identity, and positioning in Xinjiang. Uighur extremist targeting of 
soft civilian populations has largely increased along with their affiliation with Middle Eastern 
terrorist organizations such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda since 2013.52 Uighur minority uprisings threaten 
the central government’s ability to maintain unity and order through one strong, unified China.53 
It is also possible that any uprising in Xinjiang of a nationalistic manner could inspire other 
minorities in other regions, such as Tibet, to do the same.   
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Appendix D: Divergent Scenario Development 
Divergent scenario development is a futures analysis method utilized to generate a range 
of plausible future scenarios for an issue or topic. The method works by identifying three 
prominent causal drivers from causal analysis and two possible endpoints that the drivers could 
go to in the imagined future. These drivers and endpoints can be seen on Figure 9 below. After 
the drivers and endpoints are identified, there are eight plausible future scenarios for the issue 
analyzed based upon different combinations of end points. All eight scenarios are explained in an 
additional chart by stories generated by the analyst on how the future would look with the three 
specific endpoints. For this capstone project, divergent scenario development was useful in 
identifying major themes for the future of the Uighur situation in Xinjiang since it was already 
apparent that the issue was not going to remain the same. Divergent scenario development aided 
in identifying a plausible future for the conflict as well as alternatives to pay attention to. 
Divergent scenario development was also useful in identifying implications.   
 
Divergent Scenario Chart 
 
 
Figure 9: Divergent Scenario Chart. 
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Divergent Scenario Stories 
Scenario 1: “China’s Hidden Intentions” 
Islamic Terrorist Groups (ITGs) have been actively engaging in attacks within Chinese 
borders, especially in Xinjiang. Beijing isn’t concerned about these or their effects on national 
stability and moves troops into Xinjiang to deal with the ITG cells. Beijing continues to keep a 
tight lid on social media use by Uighur civilians, however, and uses the extra forces in 
Xinjiang to continue to implement the PRC’s ethnic control policies without the rest of the 
world knowing. 
Scenario 2: “China Plays the Terrorism Card” 
*Most Unprepared For: The international community is aware of the PRC’s actions against 
the Uighurs in Xinjiang and confronts Beijing on the international stage. Beijing is not fazed 
by this, as the frequent ITG terrorist attacks on Chinese soil more than justify heavy handed 
means to ensure the country’s stability. 
Scenario 3: “China’s Worst Nightmare” 
It is not a good day to be in Beijing. ITGs are carrying out frequent attacks in China and the 
international community is applying pressure over the PRC’s treatment of the Uighurs. 
Rumblings of discontent with the government have spread beyond Xinjiang and the 
government is worried that they are looking at the beginnings of a major crisis. 
Scenario 4: Radical Xinjiang 
*Most Dangerous: Fighting between ITGs and the PRC’s forces have led to a massive swing 
in public opinion against Beijing.  Uighurs begin siding with ITGs and local secessionist 
groups as separatist feelings sweep across the region.  The PRC has been able to lock down 
social media usage about the Uighurs’ treatment for now but fears of the radicalization 
spreading are prominent in Beijing.  
Scenario 5: “Business as Usual 
Not too much has changed regarding the Uighur - PRC conflict. The PRC was able to suppress 
media usage and redirect international attention in order to continue their ethnic control efforts 
in Xinjiang. The ITGs continue to show indirect involvement in the conflict with little on the 
ground support. 
Scenario 6: “China’s Relationship Crisis” 
An international spotlight on the PRC’s treatment of the Uighurs causes massive tension in the 
PRC’s relationships with both neighboring Muslim countries and western nations. As the PRC 
continues to perceive themselves as stable, their ethnic control policies and counterterrorism 
operations are way over the line in regards the Uighur’s human rights. The PRC continues to 
face little existential threat from ITGs and has no way to justify their policies to the 
international community. The PRC experiences a strong economic and political pushback as 
more and more countries cease trade with the nation.  
Scenario 7: China’s Paranoia 
*Most Likely: Despite no direct involvement from ITGs, the PRC continues to perceive 
activities in Xinjiang as a direct existential threat to their countries and carries out strong 
ethnic control and counterterrorism measures in order to control the Uighurs. There harsh 
policies cause the PRC to experience harsher human rights sanctions and slowly deteriorates 
the PRC’s relationships with Western and bordering countries. Meanwhile, the PRC slowly 
loses political control expending resources on controlling a non-issue.  
Scenario 8: “Black Mirror” 
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Xinjiang arises as a police state with Uighur citizens living similar to those in North Korea. 
With extreme technical resources deployed towards controlling the lives of Xinjiang’s citizens, 
all Uighurs are virtually forced within the confines of the Xinjiang region with no external 
help or international outreach. The PRC is able to suppress the international community's 
awareness of the Xinjiang police state. At this point, there is little direct involvement from 
ITGs as it would not even be possible for them to cross over the border in Xinjiang or reach 
Uighurs via the media.  
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Honors Appendix 1: Bridget Read 
 
 My honors component is comprised of three specific intelligence analysis methods that 
were identified as necessary throughout the intelligence analysis capstone but did not fit the 
scope and time constraints of the original project. This honors appendix is divided into three 
parts: background shift analysis, decision significance comparison, and key assumptions check.  
Each of the three pieces introduces the method, displays the method, and provides a conclusion 
as to how the method was used. All three methods were used to supplement and re-analyze the 
main methods used in formulating key judgments within the scope of the IA capstone report.  
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Background Shift Analysis 
 Background shift analysis is a causal analysis method that can be utilized to identify how 
an agent’s actions contributed to a potential unexpected consequence. The method first requires 
establishing the time period that the consequence existed in and a time period before the problem 
existed. The two time periods are than compared to each other to identify how the later time 
period with the unexpected consequence differs from the time period without the unexpected 
consequence. Next, the agent’s actions are examined for how they may have contributed to 
current environment with the consequence. These results are used to decide whether or not the 
agent’s actions could have caused the unexpected consequence.  
Background Shift Analysis Method: 
The Agent   The People’s Republic of China  
The Problem  
Possible unexpected 
consequence 
 Uighur acts of religiously motivated terrorism and 
strengthened connection to Islamic Terrorist Groups (ISIS, 
Al Qaeda, Taliban)  
Step 1: Later Time of 
Problem 
With the consequence 
 Late 2000s - Current  
Step 2: Time Before Problem 
Without consequence  
 Late 1980s - Late 1990s  
Step 3: The Shift 
How the later background (the 
causes with effect) differs from 
the earlier background (cases 
without effect) 
 * From 2008 on, the PRC experiences more legitimate 
terrorist attacks on their homeland 
* ITGs begin to utilize Uighurs and Xinjiang in propaganda 
and recruitment videos  
* Prior uprising or acts of aggression stemming from 
Uighurs tended to occur in Xinjiang and related to the 
control of cities or the territory  
Step 4: Agent’s Actions  
Contributing to the shift of the 
later background  
 * In late 2001, the PRC shifted rhetoric from regarding the 
Uighurs as a separatist threat to regarding Uighurs as parts 
of active terrorist organizations.  
Step 5: Possible Cause?  Yes. There is evidence that after the PRC targeted the 
Uighurs as a population sympathetic to terrorist 
organizations and enforced counterterrorism measures in 
2008, there was an increase in the size and frequency of 
terrorist attacks in China.  
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Conclusion 
  
 The PRC’s actions in the late 2000s – current time frame contributed to the rise in Uighur 
acts of religiously motivated terrorism in connections to Islamic Terrorist Groups (ITGs) such as 
the Taliban, ISIS, and Al Qaeda. The PRC’s shift in rhetoric in 2001 describing Uighurs as parts 
of active terrorist organizations proceeded legitimate terrorist attacks on the PRC’s homeland in 
2008 and beyond. This background shift analysis provides a greater understanding of the causal 
forces attributing to an increase in vulnerability in the Uighur population to sympathizing with 
ITGs. It also provides a better understanding of how the PRC’s actions contributed to their issues 
with the Uighurs and more specifically the connection between Uighurs and ITGs.  
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Decision Significance Comparison 
 
 Decision significance comparison is a strategy assessment method used to interpret the 
potential outcomes of a strategies against an identified key uncertainty. The method first requires 
that two outcomes to a key uncertainty are identified. These two outcomes are then compared to 
the list of potential strategies to determine what the environment would look like if the strategy 
was implemented with each possible uncertainty. This first part creates a matrix that is then 
utilized in interpreting the strategies. All strategies are interpreted as dominant options, maximin 
options, maximax options, and minimax options. These interpretations give a more diverse 
understanding of how implementing each strategy could play out in the future environment.  
 
Decision Significance Comparison Method:  
Potential Outcomes of a Key Uncertainty  
 
 The Uighurs ARE a 
Radicalized Population 
The Uighurs ARE NOT a 
Radicalized Population 
 
No Action Taken (over 
human rights violations in 
Xinjiang) 
 
 
No action taken & the Uighurs 
are a radicalized population 
 
 
No action taken & the 
Uighurs are not a radicalized 
population 
 
 
Firm Economic Sanctions 
on the PRC (targeted at key 
PRC economic interest; other 
nations encouraged to do the 
same) 
  
 
Firm economic sanctions & 
the Uighurs are a radicalized 
population 
 
Firm economic sanctions & 
the Uighurs are not a 
radicalized population 
 
Firm Political Stance 
Against the PRC’s Actions 
(directly increasing 
international pressure and 
prompting other parties to act) 
   
 
Firm political stance against 
the PRC’s actions & the 
Uighurs are a radicalized 
population 
 
Firm political stance against 
the PRC’s action & the 
Uighurs are not a radicalized 
population 
 
Forced Land Presence 
within Xinjiang (for full 
investigation of human rights 
violations) 
 
Forced land presence within 
Xinjiang & the Uighurs are a 
radicalized population 
 
 
Forced land presence within 
Xinjiang & the Uighurs are 
not a radicalized population 
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Decision Significance Comparison Method Continued: 
 
Key Uncertainty: The Uighurs ARE a Radicalized Population vs. The Uighurs ARE NOT a 
Radicalized Population 
 
 
Option: No Action Taken (over human rights violations in Xinjiang) 
 
How might is be interpreted 
as a dominant option? 
No matter what, US maintains the ability to react according 
to however the future environment unfolds. 
How might it be interpreted 
as a maximin option? 
Even if the Uighurs are a radicalized population and the US 
doesn’t take action, then at least the PRC will not be angered 
by the US’ prior involvement in the conflict. 
How might it be interpreted 
as a maximax option? 
If the Uighurs are not radicalized and the US does not take 
action, then the US remains uninvolved in the conflict. 
How might it be interpreted 
as a minimax option? 
If the Uighurs are a radicalized population and the US does 
not take action, while others are angered by the lack of action, 
still the US would not have agitated the conflict between the 
PRC and the radicalized population. 
 
 
 
Option: Firm Economic Sanctions on the PRC (targeted at key PRC economic interest; 
other nations encouraged to do the same) 
 
How might is be interpreted 
as a dominant option? 
No matter what, the US is responding to the human rights 
violations. 
How might it be interpreted 
as a maximin option? 
Even if the Uighurs are radicalized and the economic 
sanctions do not restrict human rights violations, then at least 
the sanctions would likely not be strong enough to prevent 
PRC response to radicalized terrorism. 
How might it be interpreted 
as a maximax option? 
If the Uighurs are not radicalized and the firm economic 
sanctions were enforced, then the US will have successfully 
supported Uighur human rights with little damaging action.  
How might it be interpreted 
as a minimax option? 
If the Uighurs are radicalized and the economic sanctions were 
firmly enforced, while the PRC was angered by the sanctions, 
still the US could reverse the sanctions and support the fight 
against terrorism. 
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Option: Firm Political Stance Against the PRC’s Actions (directly increasing international 
pressure and prompting other parties to act) 
 
How might is be interpreted 
as a dominant option? 
No matter what, the US is responding strongly to human 
rights violations in Xinjiang.  
How might it be interpreted 
as a maximin option? 
Even if the Uighurs are radicalized and the firm political 
stance does not restrict human rights violations, then at least 
the US did not take direct strong action against the PRC.  
How might it be interpreted 
as a maximax option? 
If the Uighurs are not radicalized and the firm political stance 
worked to restrict human rights violations, then the US will 
have strongly supported Uighur human rights with the support 
of allied nations.  
How might it be interpreted 
as a minimax option? 
If the Uighurs are radicalized and the firm political stance 
worked to restrict human rights violations, while the US and 
allied nations helped liberate the Uighurs, still the US would 
have greater information to intervene in the region. 
 
 
Option: Forced Land Presence within Xinjiang (for full investigation of human rights 
violations) 
 
How might is be interpreted 
as a dominant option? 
No matter what, the strong direct presence will aid in 
eliminating some of the human rights violations and will 
provide the US with actionable information.  
How might it be interpreted 
as a maximin option? 
Even if the Uighurs are radicalized and the US is directly 
present in Xinjiang without alleviating the human rights 
violations, then at least the US will have accurate insight into 
the conflict.  
How might it be interpreted 
as a maximax option? 
If the Uighurs are not radicalized and the US is directly 
present in Xinjiang, then the US will have strongly supported 
Uighur human rights and directly contributed to the alleviation 
of the human rights violations.  
How might it be interpreted 
as a minimax option? 
If the Uighurs are radicalized and the US is directly present 
within Xinjiang, while the US will be forced to confront the 
conflict, still the US would be prepared to do so and would 
have an accurate perception of the situation in Xinjiang.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Firm economic sanctions or a firm political stance could plausibly aid the US in 
addressing the PRC’s human rights violations in Xinjiang. Action that does not involve the use 
of force carries less of a risk in the event that the worst case scenario for the key uncertainty is 
true and the Uighurs are a radicalized population. Both firm economic sanctions and a firm 
political stance will allow the US to respond to human rights violations no matter what. 
Assessing strategies fell outside the scope of the IA capstone project, but aided in the process of 
identifying implications for the conclusion of the main project. The decision significance 
comparison method specifically pointed to the implications for not responding in the face of the 
human rights violations in Xinjiang and subsequently the different risks associated with different 
types of responses. Decision significance comparison also helped highlight a key uncertainty for 
acting in the future environment.   
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Key Assumptions Check 
 
 A key assumptions check is a technique utilized to identify certain key assumptions that 
are important to the final judgments and were assumed throughout the analytical process. The 
key assumptions are assessed based upon the evidence used in the analysis. The key assumptions 
check was updated periodically throughout the course of the capstone project and always re-
evaluated after creating a new method or starting a new draft. The technique was used to 
challenge underlying assumptions at several steps throughout the process as well as consider 
alternative possibilities to the key assumptions.   
 
Key Assumptions Check Method: 
 
Key Assumption 
 
 
Assessment 
 
The PRC does and will feel 
pressured to explain its actions in 
Xinjiang.  
High likely, given the amount of external pressure 
being put on the PRC.  
The Uighurs in Xinjiang do not 
currently constitute a major 
terrorism threat to the PRC.  
Likely, but there is still the possibility that they could 
potentially pose a larger threat due to their positioning 
in Xinjiang, ITG recruitment opportunities, and a few 
past terrorist attacks on the PRC’s homeland.  
The PRC is primarily concerned 
with the strong non-Han identity 
of the Uighur minority.  
Highly likely given ethnic control policies and their 
past behaviors towards active minority groups. 
However, the PRC also highly prioritizes keeping its 
regions free of terrorist activity.  
There are re-education camps in 
Xinjiang that violate Uighur 
human rights. 
Likely given the satellite imagery and news stories 
coming from Uighur refugees, but there is still a 
possibility that the camps do not exist to the extent to 
which is claimed in the media or that they solely 
provide vocational training. 
The main conflict between 
Uighurs and the central PRC 
government began over harsh 
ethnic control policies and the 
PAP’s actions. 
Highly likely given the lack of consistent evidence that 
the Uighurs had a strong connection to Islamic Terrorist 
Groups.  
The PRC intentionally 
overestimated Uighur 
connections to Islamic terrorist 
organizations in the early 2000s.  
Possible, but there was a lot of fear over terrorism at the 
time. Though the Uighurs may not have posed a terrorist 
threat, the PRC could have perceived them to pose a 
serious terrorist threat.  
The Uighurs in Xinjiang are a 
major concern in PRC policies.  
High likely given the amount of policies the PRC 
created to force assimilation of the Uighurs.  
The PRC is intentionally 
deceptive in their public 
documents and news sources. 
Likely, given past behavior. There are true policies and 
intentions woven within the white papers.  
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Conclusion 
 
 A majority of the key assumptions were based upon the Uighur – PRC conflict being 
primarily an ethnic conflict and not a terrorist threat. These key assumptions influenced key 
judgments within the paper. The key assumptions check was used to highlight and consider the 
alternative that the Uighurs could pose a valid threat to the PRC against all judgments made in 
analyzing the methods. The key assumptions check also highlighted the possibility that main 
piece of evidence for the existence of re-education camps in Xinjiang could not be sufficient 
enough to prove that there are human rights violations occurring in these camps. This key 
assumption led to the collection of more news sources to proceed with the analysis of the current 
situation in Xinjiang.   
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Honors Appendix 2: Ryan Walters 
 
An Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a military intelligence process used 
to direct intelligence and planning efforts through analysis of enemy threats and the operating 
environment.  Normally, the work is conducted by an Intelligence section within a battalion or 
brigade over the course of several months using various technologies and techniques to compile 
as comprehensive an idea of the enemy’s composition and potential plans as possible.  Despite 
having months of intelligence to use, the IPB is short and to the point, as the commander does 
not normally have a lot of time to listen to hours of information. Normally, an IPB is presented in 
a PowerPoint format so the intelligence officer has more flexibility to provide details as needed. 
 
An IPB is broken up into five sections.  Each section is short, only a couple paragraphs at 
the most with some images to back up the assessment given.  The first section is the friendly 
unit’s mission.  Including this ensures that the intelligence section is aware of what knowledge 
their unit requires in order to accomplish their assigned tasks.  In the case of this IPB, the 
friendly unit will be NGIC.  Next, the “Area of Operations” section details where the enemy 
force is currently stationed and working.  Pertinent details can include location of natural 
resources, average weather conditions, and the terrain in the area.  The “Enemy Situation” 
section discusses what the intelligence section knows about the enemy.  Here, the exact location, 
armament, disposition, and other factors regarding the enemy’s current state are detailed.  After 
that is the “Enemy Capabilities” section provides estimates on what the enemy forces are 
potentially capable of.  This section predominantly focuses on potential courses of action that the 
enemy could take and provides examples of possible indicators that would hint at each course of 
action.  Finally, the last section is a conclusion that summarizes the previous sections and 
provides the commander with recommendations. 
 
An IPB fit well as my Honors component for two main reasons.  First, my focus of the 
IPB was the People’s Armed Police (PAP), China’s national paramilitary police force.  The PAP 
is extremely active in Xinjiang, so learning more about the organization operates would greatly 
increase my partner and I’s understanding of the PAP’s role in the main project.  The IPB 
methodology can easily be applied to the PAP, since the PAP is a military target.  Second, IPBs 
are extremely common in the Army.  Doing an IPB for my Honors component made sense from 
a professional standpoint, as getting a familiarization of the method and how it is conducted 
would benefit me as I start my career as an Army officer. 
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IPB 
MISSION 
 
NGIC focuses on the capabilities of foreign conventional and unconventional ground 
forces. Analysis on the PAP’s capabilities and role in counterterrorism operations provides US 
analysts and decisionmakers with information on how the PRC might react to terrorist actions 
within their borders. Additionally, intelligence could be gathered to gain a further understanding 
of how the PAP could be used to support conventional military operations within Chinese 
borders. 
 
AREA OF OPERATIONS 
 
 The People’s Republic of China is a large country, spanning 9,596,960 sq km with 
mostly mountains, plateaus, and deserts in the West and plains and low-lying areas to the East.  
Most of the population resides in heavily urbanized areas in the East. The sparsely populated 
areas in the West are also home to large amounts of natural resources, such as oil and coal. As a 
police force, the PAP maintains operations within Chinese borders. The PRC’s Area of Interest 
and Influence extend further, but do not influence PAP operations as much.   
 
ENEMY SITUATION 
 
 Chinese foreign policy is often quite defensive in nature due to the perceived 
vulnerability of their borders. China’s borders are easier to attack than defend, leaving openings 
for invasions or, in the counterterrorism perspective, infiltration. Many of the western mountains 
and ridges would provide high ground for defending PAP forces to stage or defend, while relying 
on China’s intricate railway system to transport troops and supplies all over the country as 
needed.   
 
 Some key terrain for the PAP during counterterrorism operations would be the Tarim and 
Junggar basins, the Three Gorges Water Project locations along the Yangtze River, and critical 
infrastructure, such as the railways and powerplants. The basins are among the PRC’s key 
sources for oil and coal, while the Three Gorges Water project provides electricity and water 
supply to urban and rural areas along the lower and middle Yangtze River. Critical infrastructure 
allow for life to continue as normal for both the defending forces and the Chinese civilians. 
Damage or seizure of any of these locations could potentially cripple the Chinese defenses, so 
the PAP will likely have responsibility for guarding and fortifying these sites.   
 
ENEMY CAPABILITES 
 
 The PAP’s fourteen divisions and the PRC’s railway system allow for plenty of 
flexibility in deployment around the country. The PAP also has exceptional signals intelligence 
(SIGINT) collection technology, which has already been deployed in Xinjiang and other troubled 
areas to limit spread of dissenting discussion. SIGINT capabilities are one area where the PAP 
has significant opportunity for growth. Through control of the railways, the PAP can slow the 
approach of any opposing forces that attempt to use the systems to travel across China quickly. 
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   The PAP has not always reacted well to emergency scenarios. Examples like the 
Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 pinpointed weak areas in the PAP’s ability to respond quickly, 
such as insufficient supplies and slow distribution. Errors in response could lead to a drop in 
public opinion within the PRC, as could heavy handed tactics during PAP actions. Any fragility 
in the confidence of the Chinese people could be weaponized by the opposition to halt wars or 
government action, which forces Beijing to weigh options very carefully. The strengths of the 
Chinese infrastructure also highlight the railways and SIGINT structures as potential high-profile 
targets. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The PAP has three general strategies to utilize when faced with when deploying in 
domestic counterterrorism operations. The most likely one is that the PAP maintains a constant 
presence in their AO. Likely indicators of this would be the existence of patrols and checkpoints 
to maintain order and encourage civilian participation in community policing, hardening 
operations of both military and civilian targets, and PAP staging zones would be active with 
troops, vehicles, and supplies moving in and out frequently.   
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